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DESCRIPTION OF COLLATERAL IN A FINANCING STATEMENT:
SHOULD IT BE REQUIRED?
INTRODUCTION
Sections 9-110 and 9-402 of the Uniform Commercial Code set
forth the requirements for the perfection of security interests in property
pledged. as collateral for long and short-term loans.' One of the most
1. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-110:
For the purpose of this Article any description of personal property or real
estate is sufficient whether or not specific if it reasonably identifies what is
described.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-110, Comment:
The requirement of description of collateral . . . is evidentiary. The test
of sufficiency of a description laid down by this Section is that the description
do the job assigned to it-that it make possible the identification of the thing
described. Under this rule courts should refuse to follow the holdings, often
found in the older chattel mortgage cases, that descriptions are insufficient
unless they are of the most exact and detailed nature, the so-called 'serial num-
ber' test. The same test of reasonable identification applies where a descrip-
tion of real estate is required in a financing statement.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-402(1):
A financing statement is sufficient if it is signed by the debtor and the se-
cured party, gives an address of the secured party from which information con-
cerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address of the
debtor and contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of
collateral. A financing statement may be filed before a security interest other-
wise attaches. When the financing statement covers crops growing or to be
grown or goods which are or are to become fixtures, the statement must also
contain a description of the real estate concerned. A copy of the security agree-
ment is sufficient as a financing statement if it contains the above information
and is signed by both parties.
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-402, Comments 1-3:
(1) Subsection (1) sets out the simple formal requisites of a financing
statement under this Article. These requirements are: (1) signatures and ad-
dresses of both parties; (2) a description of the collateral by type or item.
Where the collateral is growing crops or fixtures, the financing statement must
also contain a description of the land concerned ....
(2) This Section adopts the system of 'notice filing' which has proved suc-
cessful under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. What is required to be filed is
not, as under chattel mortgage and conditional sales acts, the security agree-
ment itself, but only a simple notice which may be filed before the security in-
terest attaches or thereafter. The notice itself indicates merely that the secured
party who has filed may have a security interest in the collateral described.
Further inquiry from the parties concerned will be necessary to disclose the
complete state of affairs. Section 9-208 provides a statutory procedure under
which the secured party, at the debtor's request, may be required to make dis-
closure. Notice filing has proved to be of great use in financing transactions
involving inventory, accounts and chattel paper, since it obviates the necessity of
refiling on each of a series of transactions in a continuing arrangement where
the collateral changes from day to day. Where other types of collateral are
involved, the alternative procedure of filing a signed copy of the security agree-
ment may prove to be the simplest solution.
(3) This Section departs from the requirements of many chattel mortgage
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stringent requirements is that the financing statement must contain a
description of the property covered by the financing statement sufficient
to put future creditors on notice of possible existing security agreements
covering the property described.
The description requirement, although theoretically sound, has be-
come the subject of conflicting judicial interpretations, often with harsh
results. Some secured creditors have lost their secured status because of
the judicial arbitrariness in determining the sufficiency of a descrip-
tion." Other secured creditors have suffered through litigation to protect
their secured status merely because an unsecured creditor or a trustee
in bankruptcy hoped to avoid their subordinate status by attacking a
description of collateral on the grounds that it was "insufficient." '
The criteria for determining the "sufficiency" of a description under
the UCC are vague and of little value to the practicing attorney. The
purpose of this note is to analyze the necessity of the description require-
ment of the UCC in financing statements. To understand the description
requirement it is necessary to scrutinize the pre-Code security devices and
their formal requisities, and to analyze recent cases decided under the
Code for the rationale behind the current judicial interpretations of
sufficiency. With this analysis as a foundation, this note will discuss the
possible effect of the elimination of the sufficiency requirement in financ-
ing statements.
PRE-CODE FILING REQUIREMENTS
Before the adoption of the UCC, one prerequisite of a chattel
mortgage was the exact description of the mortgaged property.' With
the chattel mortgage, however, it was not always possible to describe
with accuracy the extent of property that was to be used as collateral.5
One example of this weakness was the treatment of "after-acquired"
property clauses. Under pre-Code law, the after-acquired property lien
could not be precisely described in the original mortgage. Therefore, it
did not become effective against third parties until a supplemental
mortgage, containing a proper description of the after-acquired property,
statutes that the instrument filed be acknowledged or witnessed or accompanied
by affidavits of good faith. Those requirements do not seem to have been suc-
cessful as a deterrent to fraud; their principal effect has been to penalize good
faith mortgagees who have inadvertently failed to comply with the statutory
niceties. They are here abandoned in the interest of a simplified and work-
able filing system.
2. See notes 18-77 infra and accompanying text.
3. Id.
4. G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTEREST IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 15.2, 467 (1965).
[Hereinafter cited as GILMORE].
5. Id.
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had been filed.'
The description requirement of the chattel mortgage was sometimes
treated as a statute of frauds. Failure to describe property in terms suitable
to a court's whim often resulted in a void mortgage." This failure
could not be cured even by uncontroverted and uncontrovertible proof
of the property secured by the mortgage. A typical example of this
situation involved a chattel mortgage which covered equipment that was
completely described and easily identifiable by future creditors.8 The lack
of a listed serial number, however, was held to render the description of
the property insufficient.' Such results can be explained by recognizing
the fact that courts prior to the UCC looked to Nineteenth Century cases
for a standard to use in determining sufficiency. Their decisions were
based on real property mortgage requirements and as a result strict
description in chattel mortgages was required. It should be noted that the
analogy to the real estate mortgage was more compelling seventy-five
years ago than it is today and, that the decisions of this early period
reflected a generalized judicial hostility toward all chattel security trans-
actions where the borrower remained in possession of the secured
property."0
While the law of conditional sales took over many of the chattel
mortgage requirements, many states applied them in a more relaxed
manner."
[T]he conditional sale was thought of as exclusively a pur-
chase-money device, and there was never a great deal of experi-
mentation with attempts to extend the vendor's lien to other
property of the vendee-thus the after-acquired property ques-
tion never had much importance in this field.' 2
The description requirements for conditional sales were considered funda-
mentally the same as those for chattel mortgages. While these require-
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Central Trust Co. v. Worchester Cycle Mfg. Co., 93 F. 712 (2d Cir. 1899) (cor-
porate mortgage covering realty and personalty, tools and equipment, void as to per-
sonalty even though the personalty was clearly located in the factories named in the
mortgage). See Solinsky v. O'Conner, 54 S.W. 935 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899) (serial
numbers omitted in mortgage description covering two of three machines in mortgagor's
possession, held insufficient notice) ; Leffel v. Miller, 7 So. 324 (Miss. 1890) ("one 10
horse power engine and boiler, Mames Leffel Make" insufficient description, even though
there was only one on the debtor's property) ; Hayes v. Wilcox, 61 Iowa 732, 17 N.W.
110 (1883) (mortgage describing the only thresher debtor owned, but omitted serial
number, void against attaching creditor).
9. Id.
10. GILMORE, § 2.7, at 53.
11. Id. at § 15.2, at 467.
12. Id.
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ments dictated that the goods must be described sufficiently for the
purpose of identification, 8 great specificity has proven of little value to
the searcher of the records. He must still look beyond the record to
ascertain the amount of the outstanding debt on the collateral.
Many specialized chattel security devices have been relatively free
from the requirement of strict description. The notice filing provided for
by the trust receipt and factor's legislation dispensed with any item-by-
item description in the document filed. One commentator has noted that
"[u]nder UTRA, 4 the filed notice need only describe in general terms
the kind of goods to be financed on trust receipts and the entruster is not
required to file a notice for each transaction."'"
Many of the factor's lien acts, however, require the execution of
documents whenever new inventory or accounts come under the lien.
Most of the account receivable statutes likewise require assignments to
be made as new accounts arise; statutory drafting, however, is frequently
ambiguous on this point." Typically, these documents and assignments
must describe particular items of inventory and particular accounts.
17
FILING REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE UCC
The UCC did not abolish the pre-Code security devices. It did, how-
ever, abolish the statutes governing them"s and their technical distinc-
13. See Tilton v. H.M. Wade Mfg. Co., 2 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1924) (Virginia law) :
Kammeierv v. Chauvet, 186 Iowa 958, 171 N.W. 165 (1919) : Wittler-Corbin Mach. Co. v.
Martin,'47 Wash. 123, 91 P. 629 (1907). For a case which evidences a relaxed atti-
tude towards descriptions of property both in chattel mortgages and in conditional sales
contracts, see A.S. Thomas Furniture Co. v. T. & C. Furniture Co., 120 Ga. 879, 48
S.E. 333 (1904). The mortgage-inherited insistence on over precise description occa-
sionally carried over into the conditional sales cases. See also National Cash Register
Co. v. Norfolk City Realty Co., 110 Va. 791, 67 S.E. 372 (1910) (description of cash
registers clearly sufficient to put third party on notice held insufficient).
14. UNIFORM TRUST RECEIPT ACT, HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS, 245 (1933).
15. GILMORE, § 4.11, at 122.
16. Id. at § 15.2, at 469.
17. The Texas notice filing system for assignments of accounts receivable was vir-
tually nullified by decisions holding that notice had to be filed for each account as it
arose. See Republic Nat'l Bank v. Vial, 232 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1956) : Keeran v. Salley,
244 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
The legislature saved the legislation by amending the statute. The remedial legisla-
tive action is described in Ribaudo v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 261 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1958).
An example of judicial confusion concerning the notice filing provision of UTRA is
found in Coin Mach. Acceptance Corp. v. O'Donnell, 192 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1951), in
which the court persistently states that the trust receipts themselves were filed although
such was not the case. See also In re Yost, 107 F. Supp. 432, 435 (Md. 1952).
18. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-102(2):
This article applies to security interests created by contract including pledge,
assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust deed, factor's lien, equipment
trust, conditional sale, trust receipts, other lien or title retention contract and
lease or consignment intended as security. This Article does not apply to statu-
tory liens except as provided in Section 9-310.
208
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tions in terminology and scope. Article 9 of the UCC was designed to
govern pre-Code devices 9 and to allow all common forms of security
transactions to be continued without substantial change.
The UCC, however, does work a substantial change over the pre-
Code limitations on notice filing. First, it permits the use of filing with
respect to all debtors, including comsumers ° Secondly, it encompasses
all collateral, including those goods which can be described with reason-
able specificity. 1 Thirdly, the UCC's abbreviated filing can be used not
only for short-term debts, but also for long-term obligations.
2
One authority expresses the belief that the greatest change from the
pre-Code law is "in the availability of notice filing for all kinds of collat-
eral rather than just the quick assets of a business where some form of
notice filing is pretty much necessary. '22 Unlike most pre-Code chattel
security statutes, however, the UCC does not limit notice filing to situa-
tions where it is eminently necessary to the businessman's changing assets,
such as accounts receivable and inventory.2"
The problem which arises under the UCC is that all varieties of
collateral must be secured by the same type of filing requirement. For
analysis of judicial interpretations of sufficiency of description in a
financing statement, the filing requirement must be examined in the
context of specific transactions. 2" To determine what has been deemed a
sufficient description of particular types of collateral, it is necessary to
consider them separately.2
NOTE: The adoption of this Article should be accompanied by the repeal
of existing statutes dealing with conditional sales, trust receipts, factor's liens
where the factor is given a non-possessory lien, chattel mortgages, crop mort-
gages, mortgages on railroad equipment, assignment of accounts and generally
statutes regulating security interests in personal property.
19. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-101, Comment: § 9-102(2). Comments 1
& 2.
20. BENDER'S UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE SERVICE, SECURED TRANSACTIONS, §
6.04(1), 496 (1968) [hereinafter cited as BENDER'S].
21. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-102.
22. Id.
23. BENDER'S, § 6.04(1), 494 (emphasis added).
24. Id.
25. Hanna, The Extension of Public Recordation, 31 COLUM. L. REV. 617 (1931).
26. A discussion of fixtures is beyond the scope of this note. The Code provisions
regarding fixtures are presently under study by the Permanent Editorial Board of the
Uniform Commercial Code and are subject to change. Review Committee Proposals for
Change in UCC Provisions as to Fixtures, 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 1133 (1968). The problem
of fixtures is more one of definition than of description and location of the individual
fixtures. The description requirement for fixtures, however, is generally the same as that
for crops. See, Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1319 (1962); Kripke, Fixtures under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 64 COLUm. L. REV. 44 (1964).
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Consumer Goods
In In re Trumble2 1 a financing statement, which described the
collateral as "consumer goods," was held to have perfected a security
interest in household goods, two rifles and a shotgun. The Federal
District Court for the Western District of Michigan held that the descrip-
tion gave all the notice that is required by the UCC, served a com-
mercially useful purpose and created no abuses which could not occur
through other procedures allowed by the UCC.2s An analysis of the
opinion indicates a very liberal interpretation of the UCC's filing re-
quirements.
Shortly after Trumble, the same court in In re Dubman" ruled that
a financing statement, which described collateral by reference to the
number and date of a previously filed security agreement and provided for
a secured interest in the proceeds from such collateral, was an insufficient
description of the property covered by that statement. The property
covered under the prior filing was a used car and photographic equipment.
The original statement contained no mention of "proceeds.""0 The court
concluded that the description was not sufficient to include the proceeds
obtained from a subsequent trade-in of the photographic equipment
because the description insufficiently described the original collateral
itself. 1 Apparently, the court believed that the description should be
specific enough to stick out upon the record.2 Even though the parties
27. 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 543 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
28. Id. at 546.
29. 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 910 (W.D. Mich. 1968).
30.- A security interest may attach if the security agreement and financing statement
are signed by both parties. See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-102(1). The fact that
proceeds were not secured in the original agreement should not prevent the parties from
reaching a new agreement evidenced by their signatures. Therefore § 9-402(2) appears
to be irrelevant to this case because it was signed by both parties.
31. 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 910, 914 (W.D. Mich. 1968). The court cited section 9-
402(2) (b) of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE in support of this determination. See also
United States v. Atenna Systs. Inc., 251 F. Supp. 1013 (N.H. 1966) where a loan agree-
ment, secured by "all furniture, fixtures, and equipment now owned or hereafter ac-
quired by the borrower," was held to specifically identify collateral as required by the
UCC. The agreement gave the secured party an interest in such furniture, fixtures and
equipment. The bankrupt's drawings, technical data, bids, proposals and cost estimates,
however, were considered to be intangibles rather than goods and therefore were not
secured.
32. 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 910 (W.D. Mich. 1968). The court stated:
The bank has relied on the fact that the Code adopts a system of 'Notice Filing'
and that sufficient information was set forth in the September statement to direct
interested parties to inquiry which would have disclosed the Bank's interest in
the photographic equipment. This is a good argument except that the same
argument could be made as to any requirement for description in financing state-
ments under the Code. While detailed descriptions have been eliminated under
the Code, it still requires a statement indicating the types or describing the items
of collateral.
Id. at 915.
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intended to secure specific goods, and those goods could have been
identified by reference to the previous filing statement, the description was
deemed insufficient.
Equipment and Motor Vehicles
Under pre-Code security devices, filing statements covering equip-
ment and motor vehicles required very exact descriptions of the collateral.
including the serial number of each of the secured articles.83 The UCC
and the Comments, however, have specifically dismissed this require-
ment. 4
In In re Bengston,"5 the Coca-Cola Bottling Company sold a cooler
by conditional sale to the bankrupt. On Form UCC-1 in part four, the
collateral was described as "(1) CAV. 80 $300.00 Ser. 326147.""a In
holding the description sufficient, the court stated:
Obviously with a serial number it was an appliance of some
sort sold by the Coca-Cola Bottling Co. The trade name of the
article is presumably known to the individuals who trade with
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. At any rate, the details could be easily
ascertained by inquiry of the secured party and the appliance it-
self could be precisely identified by the serial number. No one
could be "seriously misled" by the description. 7
Bengtson, therefore, indicates that the description need not specifically
describe the collateral or name it directly. Apparently the court felt that
the important requirement is that the description mislead no one.
A more liberal interpretation of sufficiency is found in In re
Bowser.3" The bankrupt was a supermarket and the equipment, to be
covered as collateral was designated by the secured party's name. The
court held that the filing of a conditional sales agreement as a financing
statement was sufficient to perfect the seller's security interest, even
though a separate sheet describing the equipment in detail was inadvertent-
ly omitted from the filed copies."9 The court concluded that any party
interested in the conditional sales agreement should be on notice that the
schedule describing the equipment was omitted inadvertently, and that the
desired information could be obtained by inquiry to the creditor.4"
33. L. JONES, CHATTEL MORTGAGES AND CONDITIONAL SALES, § 248 (6th ed. 1933).
34. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-110, Comment.
35. 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 283 (N.D. Conn. 1965).
36. Id. See Appendix for form UCC 1.
37. 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 283, 288 (N.D. Conn. 1965).
38. 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 626 (W.D. Pa. 1961).
39. Id. at 627.
40. Notice of facts sufficient to prompt an inquiry concerning secured property
capable of identification has been deemed a sufficient compliance in cases construing
et al.: Description of Collateral in a Financing Statement: Should It Be
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The UCC's liberalization of the description requirement for motor
vehicles is illustrated by In re Kline.4 The bankrupt was a new and used
car dealer, and the financing statement described the collateral as "motor
vehicles."42 Commenting on the sufficiency of this description the court
stated :
It is not necessary that the property should be capable of identi-
fication solely from the description contained in the financing
statement itself. This would appear to have been the intent of
the drafters of the Code, as by sections 9-208. They provided a
statutory procedure whereby the secured party, at the debtor's
request, may be required to approve or correct a list of the
collateral and a statement of the unpaid indebtedness. Accord-
ingly, we hold that the designation "Motor Vehicles" utilized by
Kline and Harrigan in their financing statement was a suf-
ficient statement indicating the type of property covered. 3
In Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v. Warren Lepley Ford, Inc."
the following financing statement was filed:
This financing statement covers the following types (or items)
of property: (list) motor vehicles, tractors, trailers and their
similar legislation. In York Ice Mach. v. Kearney, 344 Pa. 659, 662, 25 A.2d 179, 180
(1942) the court emphasized that "while of course, as Appellee contends, the statute
must strictly be construed, it must also be construed with common sense."
41. 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 628 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
42. Id. at 630.
43. Id. at 632-33. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-208:
(1) A debtor may sign a statement indicating what he believes to be the
aggregate amount of unpaid indebtedness as of a specified date and may send it
to the secured party with a request that the statement be approved or corrected
and returned to the debtor. When the security agreement or any other record
kept by the secured party identifies the collateral a debtor may similarly re-
quest the secured party to approve or correct a list of the collateral.
(2) The secured party must comply with such a request within two weeks
after receipt by sending a written correction or approval. If the secured party
claims a security interest in all of a particular type of collateral owned by the
debtor he may indicate that fact in his reply and need not approve or correct an
itemized list of such collateral. If the secured party without reasonable excuse
fails to comply he is liable for any loss caused to the debtor thereby: and if the
debtor properly included in his request a good faith statement of the obligation
or a list of the collateral or both the secured party may claim a security interest
only as shown in the statement against persons misled by his failure to comply.
If he no longer has an interest in the obligation or collateral at the time the
request is received he must disclose the name and address of any successor in
interest known to him and he is liable for any loss caused to the debtor as a
result of failure to disclose. A successor in interest is not subject to this sec-
tion until a request is received by him.
(3) A debtor is entitled to such a statement once every six months without
charge. The secured party may require payment of a charge not exceeding $10
for each additional statement furnished.
44. 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 1194 (Pa. C.P. Philadelphia 1957).
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equipment, appurtenances, appliances, accessories and replace-
ment parts, financed by Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank
under its Wholesale Credit Plan."
The court ruled that when the petitioner agreed to finance the automobiles
under the installment plan contract rather than the wholesale credit plan
contract, it lost its perfected security interest. The court reasoned that
because the latter plan did not permit automobiles financed under it to
be used as demonstrators, the demonstrator cars in question were outside
the financing statement." Thus, the financing statement was deemed to
cover only those automobiles financed under the wholesale credit plan.
The Girard interpretation raises the question of whether a new
financing statement is needed to cover the same type of collateral if dif-
ferent specifications for financing are used in a separate plan and contract.
If a new financing statement were required it would appear that the Code
requires transaction filing rather than notice filing. The Code, however,
specifically requires notice filing." Notice filing was specifically designed
for the type of transaction involved in Girard and to avoid the result
reached there. The purpose of notice filing is to put future creditors on
notice that there might be a secured interest in the property described. It
would appear that the UCC's requirement of a sufficient description of
collateral was used in Girard as a device to defeat the security interest.
Crops
A description of the real estate upon which the crops are growing or
are to be grown must be included in the financing statement.4 The
property need not be described by government survey, by lots and blocks,
or by meets and bounds if it can be located from the description given. 9
In the Opinion of the Attorney General of Kentucky,5" the financing
statement described the collateral "tobacco crops" 1 and described the real
estate as "the farm of C.H. Jones in West Allen County near Claire." 2
45. Id. at 1196.
46. For other automobile cases see In re Esquire Produce Co., 5 UCC Rep. Serv.
257 (E.D. N.Y. 1968); Bank of Utica v. Smith Richfield Springs Inc., 294 N.Y.S.2d
797 (Sup. Ct. 1968). See also Townsend, The Case of the Mysterious Accessory, 16
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 197 (1951) ; Welsh, Security Interests in Motor Vehicles Under
Section 9-302 of the UCC, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 265 (1968).
47. Transaction filing is the filing of a new financing statement every time a new
item of collateral is secured. Notice filing is the filing of one financing statement cover-
ing all items of a specific type or kind whenever obtained. GILMORE, § 15.2, at 468.
48. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-402(1).
49. Op. ATT'y GEN. OF ILLINOIS, 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 660 (1962).
50. 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 679 (1960).
51. Id.
52. Id.
et al.: Description of Collateral in a Financing Statement: Should It Be
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This description was deemed sufficient to identify the location of the
crops.
A problem, however, is presented where the description of collateral
becomes too specific. The financing statement in Piffot State Bank v.
Pollard Gin Co." described the collateral as:
Crops. All of the following crops to be planted or growing
within one year from the date hereof on the lands hereinafter
described: 7 acres of cotton and 53 acres of soybeans to be
produced on the lands of Mary Gilbee; 4Y acres of cotton and
11 acres of soybeans to be produced on the lands of George
Nixon; all of the above crops to be produced in Clay County,
Arkansas, during the year 1965." '
The court held this description inadequate and stated that "a mortgage
of a specified number of articles out of a larger number will not be allowed
to prevail, unless it furnishes the data for separating the property intended
to be mortgaged from the mass." ' ' The description in the Piffot case in
designating the kind of crop, the year, the name of the farmer, the county
and the state appears to comply with the general identification require-
ments mentioned in the Opinion of the Attorey. General of Kentucky.
But, the parties here went further than required and limited their secured
interest by the number of acres of crops covered. Had the description been
less specific, the financing statement may have been held valid.
Inventory and Accounts
The UCC repeatedly refers to security interests in "inventory"";
and defines the term as "all goods held or being prepared for sale."' 7 "All
goods held for sale" should be readily identifiable in the trade. To
require enumeration of all types of articles handled would seem un-
reasonably burdensome and neither within the letter nor spirit of the
UCC."8 When collateral is described as "inventory" or "accounts re-
ceivable," courts have held that it is not necessary to preface them with
the word "future." 9
53. 243 Ark. 159, 419 S.W.2d 120 (1967).
54. Id. at 121.
55. Id. For details of agricultural financing see Coogan & May. Crop Financing
and Article 9 . . . , 22 U. MIAMI L. REv. 13 (1968) ; Hunt & Coates. The Impact of the
Secured Transaction Article of Commercial Practices with Respect to Agricultural Fi-
nancing, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 165 (1951).
56. UNIFORM COMMEaCIAL CODE §§ 9-103. 9-109, 9-302, 9-308, 9-312.
57. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-109(4).
58. Thomson v. 0. M. Scott Credit Corp., 28 Pa. C. & D.2d 85 (Pa. C.P. Chester
1962).
59. In re Platt, 257 F. Supp. 478 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
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A detailed description of the collateral in the case of accounts
and inventory would require the filing of daily statements. The
addition of the word "future" to "accounts receivable and in-
ventory" would not seem to help an interested party in determin-
ing the status of the debtor. It should be clear that the creditor is
concerned with tying up whatever is the current inventory and
accounts receivable of the debtor. No reasonable searcher of
the records would conclude that the secured party has a lien
on only the past accounts and inventory of the debtor, especially
where the debtor is in an active retail business."0
Great care should be taken in describing collateral with words that
have special meaning in a trade. In Annawan Mills, Inc. v. Northeastern
Fibers Co.,6 a financing statement described collateral as "cotton waste
and proceeds." 2 The secured items in question were "cotton linters." 3
An expert testified that "cotton waste" and "cotton linters" had two
different meanings in commercial usage, "cotton waste" being a waste
product from cotton mills and "cotton linters" being a by-product in the
manufacture of oil from cotton seed." The court, citing the UCC section
1-205(3), ruled that this description was insufficient to cover the items
in question."
After-Acquired Property
The UCC specifically provides that after-acquired property can be
secured as collateral."6 Courts, however, have differed with regard to the
specificity of description necessary in the financing agreement to validate
the security interest. In Evans Products Co. v. .ergensen17 a security
agreement covering inventory, which included an after-acquired property
clause, perfected a security interest by the filing of a financing statement
which described the collateral as "inventory." The financing statement,
however, did not specifically mention after-acquired property."8 The
court concluded that it was unnecessary for the entire agreement between
60. Id. at 481.
61. 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 787 (Mass. App. 1963).
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 118.
65. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-205(3):
(3) A course of dealing between parties and any usage of trade in the vo-
cation or trade in which they are engaged or of which they are or should be
aware give particular meaning to and supplement or qualify terms of an agree-
ment.
66. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204.
67. 245 Ore. 362, 421 P.2d 978 (1966).
68. Id. at 980.
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the secured party and debtor to be put on public record and that the broad
description of the collateral as "inventory" in the financing statement was
sufficient to warn creditors that after-acquired property might well be
included. 9
The court's interpretation of sufficiency of description in Evans
appears liberal when compared with Mammoth Cave Production Credit
Association v. York."0 In the latter case a security agreement, filed as a
financing statement, provided for a security interest in "all farm equip-
ment"" presently owned by the debtor and "all property similar to that
listed above" 2 thereafter acquired by him. The court ruled that this
description of collateral was inadequate to show that the agreement
between the parties was intended to include as collateral a tractor or other
large equipment later acquired by the debtor.73 The court stated that
while a liberal construction should be given to terms used in filing state-
ments,
[t]he description must still identify the collateral so that it
can be distinguished and separated from property not covered.
The very purpose of description is to separate this property
from all others of like kind . . . . The description is studiously
designed to cover everything and describe nothing.4
The court's requirement in Mammoth Cave, that the record alone
be sufficient to put future creditors or purchasers on notice of the security
interest, would appear inconsistent with the mandate of the UCC."5
UCC section 9-110 merely requires a description by type or kind, not a
description of items within a particular type or kind. Therefore, it appears
that the decision in Mammoth Cave is, at best, questionable in the
light of the UCC.
As an alternative approach, the test of sufficiency could be whether
the description is adequate to put prospective creditors or purchasers on
notice that further inquiry is necessary to determine whether an item in
which he is interested is subject to a security interest of the secured
party mentioned in the financing statement." The notice required, by a
69. Id. at 981.
70. 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 11 (Ky. Ct. App. 1968).
71. Id. at 13.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 16.
74. Id.
75. See note 1 supra and accompanying text. Other after-acquired property cases
include: In re Taylored Prods. Inc., 5 UCC Rep. Serv. 286 (W.D. Mich. 1968) ; In re
Goodfreind, 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 160 (E.D. Pa. 1964) ; National Cash Register Co. v. Fire-
stone & Co., 346 Mass. 255, 191 N.E.2d 471 (1963).
76. In re Bloomingdale Milling Co., 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 256 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
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notice filing statute, even where great specificity is required, can never be
anything more than a starting point for further investigations.7
COMPARISON OF THE CODE'S DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT
WITH OTHER FILING REQUIREMENcrS
The decisions under the UCC have shown that financing statements
may be extremely sketchy. For example, they may only contain the names,
addresses and signatures of the parties, and may either designate the
collateral by type or by item." They need not be as informative as filings
under many of the accounts receivable statutes, which require the state-
ment that the debtor has assigned or intends to assign certain accounts ;79
nor as informative as filings under the factor's lien acts, which must be
based on an existing agreement." The UCC description requirement,
therefore, seems not only inexact but vague upon first reading.
In comparison, however, the real property description requirements,
which form the historical basis for personal property description re-
quirements, are even less precise: In analyzing real property requirements
regarding sufficiency of description it becomes obvious that no guidelines
were provided to aid the courts in determining the sufficiency of a property
description. A typical real property description must generally contain
"a description from which a competent person can locate the land intended
to be conveyed and can distinguish it from all other land."'"
The "competent person" standard would seem highly subjective,
since a reliable norm cannot be established by judicial interpretation. The
UCC's "type or kind" requirement seems clear by comparison. In the
numerous decades of recordation of real property conveyances, few cases
have dealt with the "sufficiency" of real estate description. The small
number of cases that have struck down descriptions as "insufficient" seem
to have done so only where the described property could not possibly be
ascertained from the recorded description.8" In contrast, many cases have
arisen under the UCC where unsecured creditors have contested the
"adequacy" of collateral description; even though the property could be
readily identified, too often these creditors have succeeded.
Furthermore, not only does the description requirement for a real
property conveyance lack specificity, but it is also interpreted differently
77. GILMORE, § 15.2, 470.
78. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-204(1).
79. IOWA CODE § 539.7 (1958).
80. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 1311.1(c) (1954) (requiring a statement of the maxi-
mum length of the period during which advances may be made).
81. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 18.34, 710 (A.J. Casner ed. 1958) (emphasis
added).
82. See Carrow v. Davis, 248 N.C. 740, 105 S.E.2d 60 (1958) ; City of Atlanta v.
Atlanta Trailer City Trailer Park, 213 Ga. 825, 102 S.E.2d 23 (1958).
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from state to state. The customary description by adjoiners s3 in the
Eastern states and in portions of the Southern states are rejected by most
other states."' There is a growing feeling that descriptions by state and
federal rectangular surveys"5 are inadequate because the location of the
property is ascertained largely by reference to artificial monuments whose
existence are becoming more theoretical than actual.8 Judicial inter-
pretation of these real property description requirements, however, has
been quite liberal, and courts have been reluctant to invalidate real estate
transactions for vagueness of description." It is submitted that any
"insufficiency" of description in a personal property financing statement
should likewise be inadequate to strike down the security interest.
SHOULD THE DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT BE ELIMINATED?
To eliminate the arbitrary court regulation of sufficiency, it is
proposed that the requirement of a description of collateral in the financing
statement be eliminated. A description of collateral would still be re-
quired in the security agreement so that interested parties would know
the extent of secured collateral.
The parties affected by a security agreement generally seek different
objectives in a secured transaction. The secured party not only wishes
the broadest possible description of collateral, but also endeavors to
provide adequate specificity to satisfy the vague and oftentimes subjective
requirements of "sufficiency." 8 On the other hand, the debtor would
probably seek a narrow and more specific description so that all of his
property would not be clouded by one agreement and would allow greater
flexibility in obtaining future loans. Unsecured or future creditors would
benefit from highly specific collateral description requirements, since
such requirements facilitate a search of the records for particular secured
items."9 If the search indicates that the item in which the unsecured or
future creditor is interested is already attached, recent court interpreta-
tions of "sufficiency" permit these creditors to seek loopholes in the
description and promote attempts to defeat security interests.
The UCC's requirement for description is a compromise between
83. Description by adjoiners is a method of describing property by its relation to
adjoining lots.
84. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 81.
85. Rectangular surveys are surveys in the form of a grid. Property location is
measured by its distance from grid corner points. For a description of the different types
of rectangular surveys and the type used by each state, see BOUCHARD & MOFFIT, SURVEY-
ING, 311-14 (1963).
86. 4 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY. supra note 81.
87. Id.
88. GILMORE, § 15.1, at 464.
89. Id.
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these competing positions."0 It requires only a description by type or kind
and implies that the necessary element is a warning to future creditors
that a debtor and creditor might have entered into a security agreement
by which some of the debtor's goods have been secured. Determination
of the particulars of the collateral would thus be left for future investiga-
tion by the unsecured party.9
The compromise, however, has proven inadequate. The decisions
indicate the lack of a uniform and reliable standard for judging suf-
ficiency. Confusion and ambiguity reign both in the courts and in
commercial practice, and parties acting in gcod faith are left to the
whimsical application of an inherently subjective standard. Change is
needed.
The UCC's filing requirements are a liberalization of the common
law, the purpose of Aich is to promote commerce and ease of commercial
transactions.92 The first step in the proposed change would be the elimina-
tion of the description requirement in the financing statement. The
requirement, however, would be retained in the security agreement.93
Such an approach would serve to encourage the use of commercially use-
ful and legally sound security devices, as well as to discourage needless
litigation instituted in a sense of desperation and pursued in bad faith.
Since the language of the UCC presently permits description by type or
kind, great specificty would appear unnecessary. Judicial interpretation of
UCC sections 9-110 and 9-402( 1 ), however, has exemplified the problem
of drawing a nebulous line between a "sufficient" and "insufficient"
description.
It is submitted that by eliminating the description requirement in
the financing statement, the same objective intended by the enactment of
90. This compromise may have been politically necessary for the widespread ac-
ceptance of the Code. The criticism of the Code before its adoption by the states was
that it would revolutionize security law. The Code, however, has not revolutionized
security law, which likewise may have been the result of political practicality. Now that
the Code has been adopted in 49 of the 50 states, the Code's description requirements
should be amended in the interest of commercial certainty. See HANDBOOK OF THE NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS OF UNIFORM STATE LAWS 293 (1968).
91. The primary object of filing is to provide the searcher of the record with in-
formation sufficient to put a reasonable man on notice that further inquiry is necessary
to ascertain the particulars of the transaction. This information is to be obtained from
the records which are indexed according to the names of possible debtors and held for
public inspection. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-403(4).
92. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-102.
93. The courts should not transfer the strict requirement of sufficiency from the
financing statement to the security agreement. The requirement should be interpreted
liberally and should include all the property that the debtor and the secured party in-
tended to be covered. The description in the security agreement will of necessity be
more specific because it is designed to cover only that property which is immediately
secured.
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the UCC would be achieved-unsecured parties would be on notice that
some of the debtor's property was secured.
The mere fact that the proposal would not require a description of
the collateral in the financing statement does not mean that the debtor
would not require it or that the secured pary would not volunteer it.
Since there is usually a limited number of financers with a community of
interest, it should not be difficult to arrive at an industry-wide under-
standing.9" The debtor who persists in filing broad financing statements
might find that suppliers and other creditors are unwilling to risk doing
business with him. The secured party who persisted in demanding too
wide a coverage might lose his borrowers. 95
Descriptions under the proposed change would provide an identifica-
tion as was provided under the L'CC.'" Article 9 makes it possible for
a lender to take all the debtor's assets as security, 7 and there is a
temptation to do so on the principle of the "more security, the better.", 8
Yet, it is just as unwise to take too much collateral as to take too little. It
would appear to be in the lender's self-interest to leave his debtor with as
many unencumbered assets as possible, so that the debtor's credit standing
would not be unnecessarily impaired.99 Both security agreements and
financing statements should cover only those types of collateral upon
which the lender depends.' This principle applies equally under this new
proposal. The only real change would be that the pitfall of court regulation
of "sufficiency" would be avoided.
The purpose of filing under the UCC is to give future creditors a
means to determine whether goods are secured, but the previously men-
94. Each file searcher should refuse to enter into the proposed transaction unless
the debtor and the earlier secured creditor first agree to limit the scope of their financing
statement or to enter into a satisfactory agreement designating whose interest is superior.
Coogan, Public .Votice Under the Uniform Commercial Code and Other Recent Chattel
Security Laws, Including "Noticc Filing,'" 47 low.\ L. REV. 289, 338 (1962).
95. Coogan. Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code: Priorities Among Secured
Creditors and the "Floating Lien," 72 HARV. L. REV. 835, 875 (1959).
96. It might be said that there are some financing statements filed from which a
future creditor can learn from the description given that the property in which he is in-
terested is not secured. GILMORE, § 15.2. at 470. The search is therefore completed by
scrutinizing the record alone. whereas, without any description, the searcher would have
to obtain information directly from the debtor or the secured party. This complaint,
however. has little or no merit because the secured party under the present Code is not
required to be that precise in his description. Thus, in either situation, the future credi-
tor must look beyond the record for the specificity of collateral. See Everett, Securing
Security, 16 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 49 (1951).
97. GILMORE. § 15.3, at 479.
98. Under the pre-Code law of Massachusetts. which was probably typical of most
states, the business debtor could tie up all of the present and future assets of one creditor
in order to secure both existing debts and debts arising in the future. Coogan, supra note
95, at 850.
99. GILMORE. § 15.3, at 479.
100. Id.
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tioned cases indicate that many courts have gone beyond this standard.
In Dubman,"' the court struck down a financing statement because the
specific goods were not listed on the face of the record. In Girard
Trust, 2 the court nullified the financing statement because it mentioned
the "\Vholesale Credit Plan," thus unnecessarily narrowing the kind of
security intended to be secured. The secured interest in Piffot"'0 was
destroyed because the financing statement was too specific in limiting the
amount of collateral. In light of these examples of judicial arbitrariness,
court regulation should be abandoned in order to achieve commercial
reliability.
These cases raise the question of whether a purpose is served by
requiring a specific description if the courts continue to strike down valid
security interests that are too specific. Determination of sufficiency is
arbitrary; yet, courts void secured interests where parties attempt to
follow the mandate of the law with specificity.
It should be unnecessary in obtaining a sufficient description of
collateral to invalidate secured interests merely because precise descrip-
tions are not given. The courts should not require specificity arbitrarily.
Rather, the sufficiency of a given description should be left to the
determination of the parties to the secured transaction. They are familiar
with the terms of their transactions and can determine the specificity
required." 4 The parties themselves are harmed in either case. If the
terms are too general, the debtor might not be able to find other creditors,
and might possibly face bankruptcy. With a defunct business, the secured
party's collateral would depreciate in value.
CONCLUSION
The previously discussed cases serve to illustrate the dynamic
weakness of the UCC's filing requirements for financing statements.
Much of the liberal spirit of the UCC is lost through judicial interpreta-
tion of the "sufficiency" of "specificity" in description. Creditors, not the
parties to the original agreement, who lack other legal basis for attacking
the agreement, are frequently able to defeat the entire security interest
upon the vague and technical theory of lack of sufficiency. Diverse and
101. See notes 26-29 supra and accompanying text.
102. See notes 41-43 supra and accompanying text.
103. See notes 48-50 supra and accompanying text.
104. In Massachusetts, a sample survey of the findings received by the Secretary
of State's office on September 27, 1961, indicated that the vast majority of financers
were giving specific descriptions of the collateral covered, usually including serial num-
bers. There were some general filings, such as all "furniture and fixtures located
at . . . ." or all "accounts receivable"; however, the vast majority of filings are more
specific, such as "one 1961 Chevrolet sedan, engine No. 1234567." Coogan, supra note
94, at 332.
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arbitrary judicial interpretations permeate the field of secured transactions
with uncertainty and danger. This atmosphere is unlikely to encourage the
creation and use of security interests as commercially desirable devices.
As this note suggests, an alternative to judicial regulation is avail-
able. The suggestion is not concerned with the increasing or decreasing
specificity in the financing statement. Indeed, there is a need for a more
liberal interpretation of the description requirement as well as ending the
judicial regulation of "sufficiency." "[T]here are almost no problems
under the present priority rules which cannot be avoided through the
intelligent practice of the debtors and creditors."1"5
105. The parties should continue to file the actual security agreement, especially a
chattel mortgage or conditional sale agreement, which typically covers specific collateral
and specific debts. The continued use of the trust-receipt pattern of financing would
eliminate many problems in industries where such a specific purchase-money lien cover-
ing a specific advance has been successfully used in the past. Coogan, supra note 95, at
874-75.
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This Statement is presented to a filing Maturity date, if any :
officer for filing pursuant to the IFile No ...............................
Uniform Commercial Code.
1. Debtor-name and address 2. Secured Party-name and address
CARPETS, INC. GIRARD TRUST BANK
123 Thames St. Broad and Chestnut Streets
Philadelphia, Pa. Philadelphia, Pa. 19101
3. File number of the original Financing Statement
# ................ Filed in the office of the ...................... at..................
# ................ Filed in the office of the ...................... at..................
# ................ Filed in the office of the ...................... at..................
4. Zl FINANCING STATEMENT
This Financing Statement covers the following types (or items) of property: (Describe)
Accounts and contract rights.
Inventory, including carpets and other floor coverings.
a. 0 (If collateral is crops) The above described crops are growing or are
to be grown on: (describe real estate)
b. 0 (If collateral is goods which are or are to become fixtures) The above
described goods are affixed or to be affixed to: (describe real estate)
c. 0 (If proceeds of collateral are claimed) Proceeds of the collateral are
also covered.
d. 0D (If products of collateral are claimed) Products of the collateral are
also covered.
5. 0 CONTINUATION
The Secured Party certifies that the original Financing Statement is still
effective and should be continued in accordance with the statute.
6. 0 RELEASE OF COLLATERAL
The Secured Party hereby releases the types or items of property listed in
paragraph 10 below from the above original Financing Statement.
7. 0 AMENDMENT
Item(s) ........................ of the original Financing Statement is (are) hereby
amended to read as indicated in paragraph 10 below.
8. 01 TERMINATION
The Secured Party certifies that it no longer claims a security interest under
the above original Financing Statement.
9. 0
10.
CARPETS, INC. GIRARD TRUST BANK
By: Nicholas Nap, Pres. Secured Party
By : ........................................................ By : A . Specim en
(SIGNATURE OF DEBTOR)
ALL INFORMATION TO BE TYPEWRITTEN OR PRINTED IN INK.
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